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Notes
ADMIRALTY - THE "TWILIGHT ZONE" - LONGSHOREMEN'S ACT
AND LOUISIANA COMPENSATION ACT AS CONCURRENT REMEDIES
I A longshoreman, injured in the hold of a vessel moored in
navigable waters, sought workmen's compensation under the
Louisiana act. The Louisiana district court dismissed his suit on
the ground that his exclusive remedy was the federal Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.' The court of ap-
peal held, reversed and remanded. A longshoreman injured on
navigable water can seek workmen's compensation under either
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act or
the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act. Richard v. Lake
Charles Stevedores, 95 So.2d 830 (La. App. 1957), cert. denied,
78 Sup. Ct. 535 (U.S. 1958).
This century has seen a prolonged legal battle in the courts
over the constitutionality of state workmen's compensation laws
as they apply to longshoremen2 and other harbor workers.3 The
fight began in 19174 with the case of Southern Pacific v. Jensen,
in which a five-man majority of the United States Supreme
Court held that a state workmen's compensation law was un-
constitutional insofar as it applied to a longshoreman injured on
a gangway between the ship and the dock.6 The rationale of the
1. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1952).
2. It should be noted at the outset that at the present time longshoremen are
not considered "seamen" within the meaning of the Jones Act, although this has
not always been the case. GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 282 (1957).
3. The battle might be regarded as essentially a jurisdictiona clash between the
state authorities charged with administration of the state compensation acts, and
the federal courts, vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction by Congress, 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (1948). However, it seems better to view the problem as a con-
flict between state substantive law and the substantive maritime law applied by
the federal courts. See GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 43 (1957).
For an interesting historical account of this area, see id. at 333 et seq. A con-
cise analysis of the cases can be found in 2 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 408 et seq. (1952).
4. Four years earlier in The Fred E. Sander, 208 Fed. 724 (W.D. Wash.
1913), a federal district court held that a longshoreman injured on board ship
had suffered a maritime tort, to which the state workmen's compensation act could
not validly apply. It is interesting to speculate as to what effect this long, closely-
reasoned opinion may have had on the majority in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205 (1917).
5. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
6. The alignment of the Court should be compared to that found in Mountain
Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). That case, decided just
before Jensen, was one of a group of leading cases in which the Court first con-
sidered the constitutionality per se of state workmen's compensation laws. In the
Washington case four Justices dissented from the holding that the Washington
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majority was this: the injury had occurred over navigable water;
it was thus a "maritime tort"7 and within the original and exclu-
sive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article
III, Section 2, of the Constitution; this constitutional grant of
admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts implied that a na-
tionally uniform system of substantive admiralty law was neces-
sary ;" to allow the various state compensation acts to apply to
"maritime torts" would wreck the necessary "uniformity" of
maritime law.9 Later the Supreme Court modified the Jensen
rule by holding that although a tort occurred over navigable wa-
ter and thus was "maritime," a state workmen's compensation
law could validly apply if the employment of the injured person
had been so local in nature that it had no direct relation to navi-
gation and commerce. 10 Allowing the state act to cover situations
which were "maritime but local," reasoned the court, would not
seriously prejudice the need for "uniformity," hallowed five
years earlier in the Jensen case." The result created a problem
for the harbor worker injured over navigable water.12 He could
workmen's compensation law was constitutional. These four formed most of the
majority in the Jensen case. Four of the Justices who had held for constitution-
ality in the Washington case, including Holmes and Brandeis, became the dissent-
ers in the Jensen decision.
7. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917). The rule that a
tort is maritime if it occurs over navigable water had been announced earlier in
Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914). This "locality test" is
still the one used to determine whether a tort is within the admiralty jurisdiction.
Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935) ; Vancouver Steamship
Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445 (1933). '
S. The Constitution merely extends the judicial power of the federal courts to
admiralty cases. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. However, the Supreme Court had pre-
viously declared that Article III, Section 2, implied that Congress had the power
to enact substantive admiralty law. Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130
U.S. 527 (1889)., Further, the federal courts had traditionally applied (and modi-
fied) the general maritime law as gleaned from European authorities. GILmORE &
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 42 (1957).
9. "And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to
the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the
proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
Justice Holmes, dissenting, called the majority's fear of lack of "uniformity"
in the general maritime law a "spectre." Id. at 223.
10. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
11. "[N]either [plaintiff's] general employment, nor his activities at the time
had any direct relation to navigation or commerce . . . . Under such circumstances
regulation of the rights, obligations, and consequent liabilities of the parties, as
between themselves, by a local rule would not necessarily work material prejudice
to any characteristic feature of the general maritime law, or interfere with the
proper harmony or uniformity of that law in its international or interstate rela-
tions." Id. at 476. This "maritime but local" exception to Jensen had been worked
out earlier in another context. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921)
(wrongful death action brought in admiralty court under state wrongful death
statute).
12. "It must be remembered that under the Jensen hypothesis, basic conditions
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not get an award under the state compensation act unless his oc-
cupation fit within the "maritime but local" exception to Jensen
and there was no way to determine this with certainty except by
fighting up through the appellate hierarchy. 13 If it were finally
decided that his situation was within the exclusive ambit of the
general maritime law applied by the federal courts, 14 he was
without a right to workmen's compensation of any sort, since the
general maritime law provided none.15 In 1927 Congress sought
to provide workmen's compensation in such a case by enacting
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.16
By providing that it covered workers 17 hurt over navigable water
only if the state compensation acts "may not validly apply,' 8
are factual: Does the state law interfere with the proper harmony and uniform-
ity of maritime law? Yet, employees are asked to determine with certainty before
bringing their actions that factual question over which courts regularly divide
among themselves and within their own membership. As penalty for error, the
injured individual may not only suffer serious financial loss through the delay and
expense of litigation, but discover that his claim has been barred by the statute
of limitations in the proper forum while he was erroneously pursuing it elsewhere."
Davis v. Department of Labor and Indus. of the State of Washington, 317 U.S.
249 (1942). See also Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co. v. Norton, 32 F.2d
513, 516 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
13. See GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 347 (1957).
14. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925) (repairman
on completed ship in navigable water) ; State of Washington v. W. C. Dawson &
Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) (longshoreman on ship in navigable water); Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479 (1923) (repairman on
completed ship in navigable water) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S.
149 (1920) (bargeman fell overboard, drowned) ; Peters v. Veasey, 251 U.S. 121
(1919) (award of Louisiana workmen's compensation to longshoreman hurt on
vessel in navigable water reversed); Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255
(1917) (longshoreman on ship in navigable water) ; Lee v. W. & A. Fletcher Co.,
4 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1925) (repairman on completed vessel in navigable water);
Jordan v. Frederick Leyland & Co., 7 F.2d 386 (E.D. La. 1925) (unloading ves-
sel on navigable water) ; The Fred E. Sander, 208 Fed. 724 (W.D. Wash. 1913)
(longshoreman on vessel in navigable water) ; March v. Vulcan Iron Works, 102
N.J.L. 337, 132 Atl. 89 (1926) (decedent killed in floating drydock). Cf. Doey v.
Clarence P. Howland Co., 244 N.Y. 30, 120 N.E. 53 (1918) (repairman on com-
pleted ship in navigable waters) ; Dorman's Case, 236 Mass. 583, 129 N.E. 352
(1921) (mate on harbor steamer).
15. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 76, gave the federal courts
original jurisdiction over maritime cases, but included a "saving clause," which
reserved to "suitors, in all cases, the right to a common law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it." The majority in the Jensen case had stated
that state workmen's compensation laws were not "common law remedies" within
the meaning of the "saving clause." In order to circumvent this holding, Congress
twice expanded the "saving clause" to specifically include state workmen's com-
pensation laws, but the Supreme Court struck down both attempts as unconstitu-
tional delegations of federal power. State of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co.,
264 U.S. 219 (1924) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
16. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1952). It had been settled
that Congress had the power to enact substantive admiralty law. Panama R.R. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
17. The act does not apply to the master and crew of a vessel. Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 3(a) (1), 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33
U.S.C. § 903(a) (1) (1952).
18. "Compensation shall be payable under this Act in respect of disability or
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Congress seemingly excluded from coverage those workers whom
the federal courts had placed under the state acts through the
"maritime but local" doctrine. 19 For the next fifteen years the
courts continued to use the "maritime but local" formula to clas-
sify new waterfront situations either under the state acts on the
one hand, 20 or the Longshoremen's Act on the other.
2 1
In 1941 the Supreme Court handed down a decision which did
not seem to fit this pattern.2 2 An award to a widow made under
the Longshoremen's Act was allowed to stand, even though the
deceased had been killed while demonstrating an outboard motor,
a task which certainly seemed "local" within the "maritime but
death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury
occurring upon navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)
and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation pro-
ceedings may not validly be provided by State law." Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, §3(a), 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)
(1952).
19. See GILMORE & BLACK, TuE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 339 (1957).
20. Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus. of the State of
Washington, 277 U.S. 135 (1928) (unloading sawlogs for use in mill) ; Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467 (1928) (cannery workman
pushing boat into water) ; Rosengrant v. Havard, 273 U.S. 664 (1926) (tallyman
for lumber company shot while over navigable water); Millers' Indem. Under-
writers v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926) (diver sawing off timbers from abandoned
set of marine ways) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Marshall, 95 F.2d 279 (9th Cir.
1938) (loading fish into a schooner for packing company) ; New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. McManigal, 87 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1937) (building lighthouse over navigable
water) ; Jeffers v. Foundation Co., 85 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1936) (diver inside coffer-
dam filled with water) ; Sunny Point Packing Co. v. Faigh, 63 F.2d 921 (9th Cir.
1933) (watchman on floating fishtrap) ; United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d
521 (4th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 639 (1933) (workman on launched
ship only 96% completed) ; United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, 18 F.2d 453 (5th
Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 759 (1926) (decedent fell behind dredge digging
canal across land) ; Massman Constr. Co. v. Bassett, 1940 A.M.C. 310 (E.D. Mo.
1940) (inside dry cofferdam) ; Hawkins v. Raynor, 261 App. Div. 1011, 25
N.Y.S.2d 876 (1941) (garage worker drowned protecting employer's boat during
storm) ; William Hebert's Case, 283 Mass. 348, 186 N.E. 554 (1933) (sweeper on
garbage scow) ; accord: P. J. Carlin Constr. Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41 (1936)
(ferryboat operator).
If it were decided that a workman fell within the "maritime but local" doctrine
and thus state compensation could validly apply to him, he was denied compensa-
tion under the Longshoremen's Act even though the state had no compensation act.
United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1933).
During this period other situations were classed under the state acts, not be-
cause they were "maritime but local," but because they were not maritime at all,
since they did not occur over navigable water. For example, an injury to a long-
shoreman on land was not a maritime tort. Colonna's Shipyard v. Lowe, 22 F.2d
843 (E.D. Va. 1927) ; Smalls v. Atlantic Coast Shipping Co., 261 Fed. 928 (E.D.
Va. 1919). Neither was an injury to a longshoreman on a dock, since the dock was
considered an extension of the land. T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S.
179 (1928) (longshoreman struck on dock, from which he fell into navigable water
and drowned) ; State Industrial Comm'n of New York v. Nordenholt Corp., 259
U.S. 263 (1922) ; Netherlands American Steam Nay. Co. v. Gallagher, 282 Fed.
171 (2d Cir. 1922) ; Swayne & Hoyt v. Barsch, 226 Fed. 581 (9th Cir. 1915). Of.
Seifort v. Keansburg Steamboat Co., 20 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (watchman
hurt on dock not within coverage of Jones Act).
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,local" rule and thus presumptively within the exclusive coverage
of the state act.23 Language in the decision indicated that per-
haps the court had given up the "maritime but local" exception
entirely and returned to the unqualified preemption of the
Jensen case.24 However, the following year the Court revealed
what had been behind the decision by creating the now-famous
"twilight zone," an area of situations wherein the injured worker
could recover under either the federal or state act.25 What com-
prised the "twilight zone" was by no means clear, but apparently
the Court meant to include within it at least all the possible wa-
terfront situations which had not already been before the courts
and thereby become classified either under the Longshoremen's
Act or the state acts. 26 The "twilight zone" was indeed "theoretic
21. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935) (longshoreman
knocked from ship onto dock; compare with T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276
U.S. 179 (1928)) ; Vancouver S.S. Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445 (1933) (longshore-
man on ship in navigable water) ; Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks, 285 U.S.
502 (1932) (workers drowned while being ferried to work) ; Employers' Liab.
Assur. Corp. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 (1930) (auto company employee hurt unload-
ing parts from ship in navigable water) ; John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281
U.S. 222 (1930) (repairing completed ship in navigable water) ; Nogueira v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 281 U.S. 128 (1930) (railroad employee on
car float in navigable water) ; London Guarantee & Acc. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Comm'n of California, 279 U.S. 109 (1929) (decedent drowned swimming to reach
boat in storm) ; Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928) (un-
loading ship in navigable water) ; Union Oil Co. v. Pillsbury, 63 F.2d 925 (9th
Cir. 1933) (watchman on floating drydock) ; T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Tanner, 44
F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1930) (stencilling railroad ties on barge in navigable water) ;
Puget Sound Nay. Co. v. Marshall, 31 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Wash. 1940) (watch-
man on ferry) ; Lake Washington Shipyards v. Brueggeman, 56 F.2d 655 (W.D.
Wash. 1931) (worker remodelling ship in navigable water) ; Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co. v. Brown, 47 F.2d 265 (N.D. 11. 1930) ; Merchants' & Miners' Transp.
Co. v. Norton, 32 F.2d 513 (E.D. Pa. 1929) (repairman on completed ship in
navigable water) ; LaCasse v. Great Lakes Eng'r Works, 242 Mich. 454, 219 N.W.
730 (1928) (repairing completed ship in navigable water).
22. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
23. Ibid. For earlier cases classifying situations as "maritime but local," see
note 20 supra.
24. To the argument that the situation in the case was within the "maritime
but local" doctrine, the Supreme Court, through Justice Black, replied that "the
decision of this Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, however,
severs a link in this chain of reasoning. For under the holding of that case, even
in the absence of any Congressional action, federal jurisdiction is exclusive and
state action forbidden in an area which, although of shadowy limits, doubtless em-
braces the case before us." Id. at 247. "While the proviso of § 3(a) appears to be
a subtraction from the scope of the Act thus outlined by Congress, we believe that,
properly interpreted, it is not a large enough subtraction to place this case outside
the coverage which Congress intended to provide." Id. at 249.
25. Davis v. Department of Labor and Indus. of Washington, 317 U.S. 249
(1942). The federal commissioner's "conclusion that a case falls within the federal
jurisdiction is therefore entitled to great weight and will be rejected only in cases
of apparent error." Id. at 256. However, if the state has taken jurisdiction, the
Court will rely "heavily on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the
state statute." Id. at 257.
26. "There is, in the light of the cases referred to, clearly a twilight zone in
which the employees must have their rights determined case by case, and in which
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illogic" 27 in that it caused the federal and state acts to overlap
in doubtful cases, even though the federal act by its own terms
cannot apply where state acts may validly apply.28 However, the
next two Supreme Court cases on the subject apparently made
the "twilight zone" even broader.29 There the employees had
been injured while repairing completed vessels on navigable wa-
ter.30 Even though this situation had often been litigated and
was invariably classed as outside the scope of the state compen-
sation acts, 31 the workmen chose to sue under state acts. 2 In
both cases the Supreme Court upheld the workman's choice.33
particular facts and circumstances are vital elements." Id. at 256. See Comment,
33 WASH. L. REV. 312, 322 (1958).
27. In his concurring opinion in the Davis case Justice Frankfurter referred to
the "twilight zone" as "theoretic illogic." Davis v. Department of Labor and Indus.
of Washington, 317 U.S. 249, 259 (1942).
28. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 3(a), 44 STAT.
1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1952).
Dissenting, Chief Justice Stone had contended that the majority's attempt to
remove the difficulties in the area "by construing state workmen's compensation
acts and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act so that their coverages
overlap, can hardly be deemed to be within judicial competence." Davis v. Depart-
ment of Labor and Indus. of Washington, 317 U.S. 249, 260 (1942).
29. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948) ; Baskin v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949).
30. See cases cited note 29 supra.
31. John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930) ("Repairing a com-
pleted ship lying in navigable waters has direct and intimate connection with navi-
gation and commerce as has been often pointed out by this Court." Id. at 232) ;
Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427 (1927) ; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.
Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925) ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261
U.S. 479 (1923); Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co. v. Norton, 32 F.2d
513 (E.D. Pa. 1929) ; Lee v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., 4 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1925) ; Lake
Washington Shipyards v. Brueggeman, 56 F.2d 655 (W.D. Wash. 1931) ; LaCasse
v. Great Lakes Eng'r Works, 242 Mich. 454, 219 N.W. 730 (1928) ; March v. Vul-
can Iron Works, 102 N.J.L. 337, 132 Atl. 89 (1926) ; Doey v. Clarence P. How-
land Co., 224 N.Y. 30, 120 N.E. 53 (1918). Accord, Union Oil Co. v. Pillsbury,
63 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1933).
32. Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 89 Cal. App.2d 632, 201 P.2d 549
(1949) ; Moores' Case, 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948).
33. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948) (per curiam memoran-
dum decision, containing simply a citation to Davis v. Department of Labor and
Indus. of Washington, 317 U.S. 249 (1942)) ; Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
338 U.S. 854 (1949) (refusal of state court to award compensation reversed, and
remanded with suggestion that the lower court consider Moores Case, 323 Mass.
162, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948)). The treatment originally accorded the Moores case by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is interesting. Well aware of the
pre-twilight zone precedents classifying the situation as maritime, the Massa-
chusetts court nevertheless refused to follow them, stating:
"Although apparently some heed must still be paid to the line between State
and Federal authority as laid down in the cases following the Jensen case, the most
important question has now become the fixing of the boundaries of the new 'twi-
light zone,' and for this the case gives us no rule or test other than the inde-
finable and subjective test of doubt . . . . Probably therefore our proper course
is not to attempt to reason the matter through and to reconcile previous authori-
ties, or to preserve fine lines of distinction, but rather simply to recognize the
futility of attempting to reason logically about 'illogic,' and to treat the Davis
case as intended to be a revolutionary decision deemed necessary to escape an
intolerable situation and as designed to include within a wide circle of doubt all
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The decision in the present case hinged on the court's analysis
of these last two cases. In those cases the employees, who would
have been clearly within the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act
under the pre-"twilight zone" decisions,3 4 were allowed compen-
sation under the state acts.35 The court in the present decision
reasoned that the "twilight zone" had been extended by the Su-
preme Court to include all waterfront injuries.36 Thus, although
the plaintiff in the instant case, a longshoreman hurt on navi-
gable water, would formerly have been placed under the federal
act,37 he had brought his suit under the state act, and so his
choice should be upheld. 38
According to the Court's analysis of the Supreme Court cases,
the Longshoremen's Act and the state acts are now concurrent
remedies.3 9 Although the Court's conclusion has been expressly
waterfront cases involving aspects pertaining both to the land and to the sea where
a reasonable argument can be made either way, even though a careful examina-
tion of previous decisions might disclose an apparent weight of authority one way
or the other." Moores' Case, 323 Mass. 162, 167, 80 N.E.2d 478, 480 (1948).
34. See note 31 supra.
35. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948) ; Baskin v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949).
36. Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, 95 So.2d 830, 831 (La. App. 1957).
The court referred extensively to the analysis in 2 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION 408 et seq. (1952).
37. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935) ; Vancouver S.S.
Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445 (1933) ; Spencer Kellog & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks, 285 U.S.
502 (1932) ; Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 (1930) ; No-
gueira v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 281 U.S. 128 (1930) ; Northern
Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205 (1917). Accord, T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Tanner, 44 F.2d 928 (5th
Cir. 1930) (employee stencilling railroad from barge on navigable water).
38. Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, 95 So.2d 830 (La. App. 1957).
39. The court referred to the present state of the law as amounting to a "con-
current jurisdiction exercised by both State and federal tribunals, each jurisdiction
deciding for itself whether it shall apply its own law, such determination being
relatively final." Id. at 831.
However, there may be a difference in the "finality" of a state authority's de-
cision on whether to take jurisdiction of a case and that of the federal commis-
sioner. The Supreme Court has indicated that it will accord nearly absolute finality
to the findings of the federal commissioner regarding jurisdiction. Avondale Ma-
rine Ways v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953) ; Davis v. Department of Labor
and Indus. of Washington, 317 U.S. 249 (1942). The Commissioner will probably
.be upheld whether he accepts jurisdiction over a case or refuses to do so. GILMORE
& BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 353 (1957). On the other hand, the Davis and
Baskin cases clearly show that a state authority's refusal to take jurisdiction over
a case can be reversed by the federal court. Ibid.
However, it would appear that once a state authority has taken jurisdiction
of a case, it will not be reversed by the Supreme Court, since the state compen-
sation act would be presumed constitutional under the doctrine of the Davis case.
Comment, 33 WASH. L. REv. 312, 323 (1958) ; GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 354 (1957) (inferentially). Contra, 2 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION 418-19 (1952), wherein it is argued that the problem in this
area is still one of federal preemption, and a federal court can always decide that
a state authority has invalidly taken jurisdiction over a case.
A related question is whether there can be awards under both the federal and
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disapproved by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit,40 it appears to the writer to be correct. In every case since
1941, including the 1959 decision of Hahn v. Ross Island Sand &
Gravel Co.,41 the Supreme Court has refused to upset a harbor
worker's choice.4 2 Admittedly, there is "theoretic illogic" in say-
ing the federal act is concurrent with the state acts, when the
federal act expressly states that it cannot apply where state acts
may validly apply.4  However, the practical result simplifies
the problem for the injured harbor worker.44 If the Longshore-
state acts. It would appear that an employee can get a supplemental award under
the Longshoremen's Act after he has received an award under a state act. Western
Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. O'learne, 192 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1951) ; 2 LARSON,
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 418 (1952) ; GILMORE & BLACK, THE
LAW OF ADMIRALTY 354 (1957). Larson contends that federal supremacy in this
area precludes a state's making an award once an award has been made by the
federal commissioner. 2 LARSON, Zoe. cit. supra. However, it would appear that
any such federal "supremacy" disappeared with the advent of the "twilight zone,"
and therefore a state may validly make a supplemental award to one already made
under the Longshoremen's Act. GILMORE, & BLACK, loc. cit. supra.
40. Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1958) (Long-
shoremen's Act held exclusive remedy for ship repairman injured over navigable
water). In a thorough and well-documented opinion the court concluded that the
"twilight zone" was meant by the Supreme Court to include only those situations
which had not previously been classified either under the federal or the state acts.
Since a ship repairman had often been classified under the Longshoremen's Act,
the court concluded that he did not fall within the "twilight zone." However, the
court admitted that even under a theory of concurrent remedies its decision would
have been the same, since the worker had in fact chosen the federal act. Id. at 224.
41. 79 S.Ct. 266 (U.S. 1959) ("twilight zone" doctrine interpreted as giving
"an injured waterfront employee an election to recover compensation under either
the Longshoremen's Act or the Workmen's Compensation Law of the state in
which the injury occurred." Id. at 267). There the plaintiff was injured on a
gravel barge in navigable water. His employer was covered under the Longshore-
men's Act but had elected not to come under the Oregon compensation statute,
which provided that an employer's failure to participate would subject him to a
negligence suit, against which he could interpose no traditional common law de-
fenses. The Supreme Court held that the employee could sue under this provision,
since his occupation was within the "twilight zone." Of course, the employee's
occupation had apparently never been classified under either the state or federal
act, and thus would appear to be within the "twilight zone" as originally de-
lineated in Davis v. Department of Labor and Indus. of Washington, 317 U.S.
249 '(1942). Thus the Supreme Court's holding that the worker was entitled to
pursue the remedy he had chosen does not precisely support the doctrine of con-
current remedies as framed in the instant case.
42. Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949) ; Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948) ; Davis v. Department of Labor and Indus. of
Washington, 317 U.S. 249 (1942); Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S.
244 (1941).
43. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 3(a), 44 STAT.
1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1952).
44. However, the result may well be to complicate matters for the employer,
since he has no way of knowing in advance which act an injured employee will
choose. See Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1958),
where the court suggests that concurrency of the acts will result in an employer
being liable to civil and criminal penalties under both during the time the employee
is deciding which to choose. Perhaps the only way an employer can adequately
protect himself is to suffer the additional expense of securing coverage under both
NOTES
men's Act is concurrent with the state compensation act, he need
not pursue a costly appeal merely to find out which act applies
to him, but can simply choose between the two without fear of
having made the wrong choice. 4 5
C. Jerre Lloyd
CRIMINAL LAW- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE PROHIBITING
POSSESSION OF HYPODERMIC NEEDLE WITHOUT CRIMINAL INTENT
Defendant was convicted under a Louisiana statute' making
it a crime to possess a hypodermic needle. The statute, with cer-
tain exceptions, 2 imposed criminal liability for mere possession
with no consideration given to the intended use of the needle. In
the original trial3 the state introduced evidence of the presence
of a barbiturate in the box where the needle was found. Defend-
ant offered evidence to prove that he had never used the needle
for the administration of narcotics. The state's objection of
irrelevancy to this offer was sustained in the district court on
the grounds that the defendant was being prosecuted for pos-
session alone, and intent was therefore irrelevant. On appeal,
the case was remanded by the Supreme Court on the grounds
that evidence tending to show an illegal intent and evidence
tending toward disproving this intent are both relevant in all
criminal prosecutions. 4 On retrial, the defendant was again con-
victed, with the evidentiary matter apparently never again be-
coming an issue. On appeal of the second conviction, the de-
the Longshoremen's Act and the applicable state act. See Hahn v. Ross Island
Sand & Gravel Co., 79 S.Ct. 266 (U.S. 1959) (employer subjected to negligence
suit resulting from failure to participate in state compensation plan even though
employer was covered under the Longshoremen's Act).
45. A comparison of the benefits under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act with those under the Longshoremen's Act can be found in MALONE, Lou-
ISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE 606-12 (1951). For a
short discussion of the possibility of obtaining awards under both the Louisiana
act and the federal act, see note 39 8upra.
1. LA. R.S. 40:962(B) (1950) : "It is unlawful for any person, except a
dealer in surgical instruments, apothecary, dentist, veterinarian or nurse, attend-
ant or intern of a hospital, sanatorium or institution in which persons are treated
for disability or disease, at any time to have or possess a hypodermic syringe or
needle unless such possession be authorized by the prescription or certificate of a
physician issued within the period of one year prior thereto. Provided that this
sub-section shall not be held to apply to syringes or needles for the treatment of
fowl or livestock." The term "physician" is defined to mean a person authorized
to practice medicine in the State of Louisiana.
2. Ibid.
3. State v. Birdsell, 232 La. 725, 95 So.2d 290 (1957).
4. See note 16 infra.
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